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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------------------------------Karen R. Hofmann,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

No. 16265

Elizabeth S. Sullivan,
Defendant-Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Appeal From the Order of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable

Christin~

M. Durham, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for damages arising from the breach of
an agreement to convey real property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff and Defendant both moved for summary judgment in this matter.

The lower court denied Plaintiff's motion

for summary judgment and granted Defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the summary
judgment granted in favor of Defendant and enter a judgment
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in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of $9,450.00, or in the alternative that the case be remanded to the trial court for
the purpose of awarding damages to Plaintiff for breach of
the agreement.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A different aspect of this case involving many of the
same facts was before this Court recently in Case No. 15742
involving the same parties.

The case was argued before the

Court on February 21, 1979.

The prior and present appeal both

center around the same lease agreement and in particular, paragraphs 13. and 14. of that agreement which are as follows:
"13. Upon expiration of this lease, the Lessee
shall have first right of refusal in signing
of a lease for this premises, and first right
of refusal in acceptance of the sale of said
premises.
14. Upon expiration of this lease (or before
if mutually agreed upon) the Lessee shall be
able to apply one hundred dollars ($100.00)
per month of the above agreed rental upon the
sale price of the premises, set at this date
as Forty nine thousand five hundred dollars
($49,500.00).
If. the Lessee does not wish
to exercise this option, the full amount of
monthly rental shall be reverted to rental
only and considered as obligation to carrying out terms of the lease."
In the prior appeal, Appellant claimed that paragraph
14. gave her an absolute option to buy the premises at the
expiration of the lease for the price stated.

The Third

Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable
Bryant H. Croft presiding, denied Plaintiff's claim stating
that paragraphs 13. and 14. must be read together and that
the effect of the two paragraphs so combined was to give
Appellant only a conditional option to purchase the premises
if and when Respondent decided to sell.

Appellant's prior

appeal was therefore based in part on Judge Croft's interpreSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tation of the document as stated, Appellant's position being
that paragraphs 13. and 14. were separate and distinct.
Appellant's second action resulting in the present appeal
was brought for the reason that Respondent did in fact decide
to sell the premises and did in fact sell the premises to a
third party without first offering the premises to Appellant
and without notifying the Appellant of the sale.

The sale

of the property to the third party was finalized on January
13, 1978, ten days before judgment in the prior action was
entered.
cash.

The sale price to the third party was $57,750.00,

(Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of In-

terrogatories, No.'s 2., 3., and 6.)
Appellant commenced the instant action after learning of
the sale of the premises to a third party.

Appellant and Re-

spondent both moved for summary judgment in the lower court.
Appellant moving for summary judgment in the amount of $9,450.00
or in the alternative for a summary judgment in Appellant's
favor on the issue of liability only.

Respondent brought her

motion for summary judgment on the theory that Appellant's
right to purchase the premises expired at the expiration of
the lease, October 14, 1977.

On December 28, 1978 the lower

court filed a memorandum decision and the order denying Appellant's motion for summary judgment and granting Defendant's
motion for summary judgment was entered on January 9, 1979.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
AS A MATTER OF LAW, RESPONDENT HAS BREACHED THE
WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND APPELLANT
IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT FOR THE RESULTING DAMAGES.
The written agreement is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint
and is also attached to Defendant's Affidavit Supporting Motion
for Summary Judgment.

The agreement provides for the lease to

Appellant of a certain dwelling owned by Respondent.

Pursuant

to the lease provisions, Appellant entered into possession
for the one year term ending on the 14th day of October, 1977.
Appellant paid to Respondent the monthly rent provided in the
agreement.

(Affidavit of Hofmann, No. 3)

The agreement provided in part the following:
"13. Upon expiration of this lease, the Lessee
shall have first right of refusal in signing
of a lease for this premises, and first right
of refusal in acceptance of the sale of said
premises.
14. Upon expiration of this lease (or before
if mutually agreed upon) the Lessee shall be
able to apply one hundred dollars ($100.00)
per month of the above agreed rental upon the
sale price of the premises, set at this date
as Forty nine thousand five hundred dollars
($49,500.00).
If the Lessee does not wish to
exercise this option, the full amount of monthly
rental shall be reverted to rental only and considered as obligation to carrying out terms of
the lease."
On January 13, 1978, Respondent sold the subject property
to a person other than Appellant for the cash price of $57.750.00,
Appellant was given no notice of the intended sale nor was
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Appellant offered an opportunity to be the purchaser at said
sale.

Appellant would have purchased the subject property had

it been offered to her.

(Affidavit of Hofmann, No. 5. and 6.)

Appellant's claim that Respondent breached the agreement
is based on Paragraph 13. of the agreement which grants a right of
first refusal in acceptance of the sale of the premises upon
expiration of the lease.

The nature of a right of first re-

fusal was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Russell v. Park City, Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889 (1976).

Therein

the Court stated at page 891:
"We note awareness that what is often called
'the right of refusal' is not the same as an
option, wherein the optionee has a definite
right to purchase, whereas, the right of refusal has no effect until and unless the party
granting it • • • decides to sell."
A right of first refusal therefore continues until the event
of sale.

The granter of the right controls the length of time

during which the right of first refusal continues by his de-

cision as to whether or not to sell.

Since the right of the

grantee to purchase arises only when the granter decides to
sell, no date of expiration for the right need be stated or
determined as in the case of an option where the optionee is
granted an absolute right to purchase during a certain time
period.
In accord with the foregoing discussion is the case of
Cummings v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1912).

The

agreement therein provided for the sale of certain shares of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stock and in addition provided:
" . • and also to give an option on all their
or either of their interest in the estate of
Julian Moses, deceased, or refusal to purchase
the same at a price as low as any other bona
fide offer for it or any portion of it • • • "
The appellants in that case claimed that the agreement granted
them the right to purchase the property when the respondents
decided to sell.

The appellants established at trial that

the property had been sold approximately nine months after the
above agreement was signed, and further established that the
sale was made without the knowledge or consent of appellants.
In response to the respondents' argument that the agreement was
unfair because it contained no time limit, the Court made the
following comments:
"Counsel contend that it appears from the
face of the agreement that it is unfair
because it contains no limit of time within
which the option should be exercised. This
objection has no merit, because no time limit
was necessary under the terms of the agreement.
The option was to become effective only in
case the Nielsons desired to sell their interest
in the land mentioned in the agreement.
If they
did not wish to sell, they were not bound to do
so; but, if they did intend to sell, then under
the agreement they bound themselves for a valuable consideration expressed therein to give the
appellants the option, or, as it is expressed
in the agreement, 'refusal to purchase', the
interest mentioned . • • " Cummings at 165
In the instant case, the written agreement which was
drafted by the Respondent provides that the Appellant's right
of first refusal commences upon expiration of the lease,
October 14, 1977.

Respondent states in her affidavit dated
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May 16, 1978, that she sold the subject property on January
13, 1978 to a person other than Appellant.

Appellant was

given no notice whatsoever of the intended sale as stated in
Appellant's affidavit.

Respondent has therefore breached the

agreement and Appellant is entitled to a judgment for the
resulting damages as a matter of law.

The Court in Cummings

stated at page 165:
"If the Nielsons desired to sell they were
thus required to give Mr. and Mrs. Cummings
an opportunity to purchase - that is, the
refusal to purchase the interest in the lands.
This is too plain for cavil, because by the
term 'refusal to purchase' everybody knows
what is meant, although the condition may not
be fully expressed. What is meant thereby
is that, if the owners of the interest in
question desired to sell it, they must communicate that fact to the party holding the
option to purchase, and thus give the latter
an opportunity to purchase or to refuse to
do so. If the latter refuses, he has fully
exercised his option. If, however, he then
expreses his willingness to purchase, the
question of price arises."
The matter of price and damages is addressed in the next
point of argument.
POINT II
THE AGREEMENT OF PARTIES PROVIDES
THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
PURCHASE THE PROPERTY FOR THE
SUM OF $48,300.00.
As mentioned in the Statement of Facts, the written agreement between the parties has been the subject of prior litigation and appeal to this Court.

Paragraph 14. of the agreement

refers to an option at the sale price of $49,500.00.
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The same

paragraph provides that the Lessee

(Appellant) shall be able

to apply $100.00 per month of the rental payments towards the
sale price, resulting in the sale price of $48,300.00.
In the prior action, Judge Croft found that paragraph
14. did not grant Appellant an absolute option to buy the
property at the price stated.

Judge Croft's reasoning was as

follows:
"And you read paragraph 13 and paragraph 14
together, and I do not find that it is a clear,
unequivocal option to the plaintiff to buy at
the end of the lease period should she elect to
do so. Rather, I think that the rather clear
intent is that if the defendant decides to sell
at the end of the lease period, or before if the
parties agree, you see, then the plaintiff would
have the first right of refusal. And if she
exercised the right to buy upon the defendant
deciding to sell then under paragraph 14 a
hundred dollars a month of her monthly rentals
would be applied to the purchase price."
(Tr. motion for new trial, p. 14 ln. 20-29,
presently part of record in Supreme Court No.
15742)
"If the plaintiff exercised her right to
buy, exercised her first right of refusal
by deciding to buy, then under paragraph
14, I don't think there is any question
that she would be able to apply $1,200.00
of the rental paid to the purchase price set
out in that paragraph."
(Tr. plaintiff's
motion for new trial, p. 15, ln. 10-15,
presently part of record Supreme Court No.
15742)
Judge Croft's position is that because paragraph 13. which
grants a right of first refusal precedes paragraph 14. granting
the option at a fixed price, the combined effect is to give
Appellant the right to purchase upon the stated price in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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paragraph 14. only in the event Respondent decides to sell.
Since the Respondent did subsequently did decide to sell,
Appellant should therefore have been allowed to purchase at
the price of $48,300.00.

If this were not the case, paragraph

14. would have no application whatsoever in the agreement.

If

Appellant cannot demand to purchase the property at the stated
price upon the expiration of the lease as she attempted to do
with the assistance of the courts in the prior action, and if
Appellant is not allowed to have the benefit of the stated
price now that Respondent has decided to sell the property,
then Appellant's rights under the agreement are merely a
fiction.
It should be noted that Appellant's status in the negotiation of this agreement was that of tenant and Respondent's
status was that of landlord.

It was established without dis-

pute in the prior action and in this action by way of Appellant's
affidavit that Respondent was entirely responsible for the
drafting and preparation of this agreement and that the Appellant
as a tenant was merely presented with the agreement for signature.

As this Court has observed in Bonneville on the Hill Co.

v. Howard N. Sloane, 572 P.2d 402, 403 (Utah 1977):
nin view of the dispute which has arisen, the
meaning of that covenant quoted above should
be determined from the language of the lease,
and the circumstances in which it was used,
as manifesting the intent of the parties. In
that connection, a foundational rule is that
if there is any doubt or uncertainty in the
language, it should be strictly construed
against the plaintiff landlord, who furnished
Sponsored by the
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for digitization provided
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There is no equity in the proposition that a landlord can
draft a lease and therein dangle the opportunity to purchase
the leased premises at a stated price before the eyes of the
tenant and then after receiving the consideration of rental
payments during the lease period, snatch away the tenant's
benefit of the bargain which only matures when the lease
period expires.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES IN THE
SUM OF $9,450.00, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE
A NEW TRIAL TO DETERMINE DAMAGES.
It is the well settled rule in Utah that the measure of
damages for failure to convey real property is the difference
between the market value of the property at the time of breach
and the purchase price agreed upon.

In accordance with the

foregoing discussion, Appellant should have been allowed to
purchase the property for the agreed price of $48,300.00.
The Respondent states in her Answers to Interrogatories that
the property was advertised in the newspaper and that the
property was sold for the cash price of $57,750.00.

For the

purposes of this appeal, Appellant does not dispute the sum
of $57,750.00 as the market value of the property.

No other

evidence of market value was offered in this action alghough
the Respondent testified at the trial in the prior action that
she recently obtained an appraisal for $58,500.00.
ln. 18-23)

(Tr. p. 43,

Assuming that the price at which the property was

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

actually sold is in fact market value, Appellant's damages
are fixed at $9,450.00.

In the alternative, Appellant re-

quests this Court remand this matter to the lower court for
the purpose of awarding damages.

This relief is consistent

with Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment in the lower
court where it was moved in the alternative for summary judgment as to liability only with the matter of damages being
reserved for trial.
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CONCLUSION
The Court below conunitted reversible error by finding
that Appellant's right to purchase the property was extinguished at that exact point in time when the lease expired.
According to the express words of the agreement, Appellant's
right came into existence only upon expiration of the lease
and if that right expired at the same time it did not exist
for any practical purpose.

The correct view of a first re-

fusal right was pronounced by this Court in the Cununings case
where it was held that such a right continues until the granters
decision to sell at which time the granter must first of fer
the sale to the holder of that right.

If a right of refusal

were held to exist only at the instant in time at which it
were granted, the

granto~

would simply delay his decision to

sell and escape any duty to the holder of the right who has
paid a consideration therefore.
According to the view expressed by Judge Croft, at the
time of Respondent's decision to sell, Appellant should have
been offered the opportunity to purchase the property at
$48,300.00.

Respondents sale to a third party for the sum

of $57,750.00 denied Appellant the benefit of her bargain in
the amount of $9,450.00 which Appellant is entitled to judgment therefore.

In the alternative, Appellant requests that

this case be remanded to the lower court for determination
of damages.
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Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE

I

I

By JAMES R. SOPER
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I certify that I caused to be delivered two copies of
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Carol Brockbank Olson,
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, Twelfth Floor, Continental
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this

J.:l!!l_

April, 1979.
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